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2by Kenneth Bernauer'"
TheAsiandollarmarkethas grown ata very rapid
pace since its inception in 1968. From a small base
of $30.5 million, the market's size in its major
center-Singapore-reached$85 billion at the end
of 1981. Nearly as dramatic has been the transfor-
mation of the market's structure and functions. At
the beginning it was almost exclusively an inter-
bank market that served as an adjunct to the Euro-
dollar market. But given the impetus of the 1973-
1974 oil price "shocks," it has become a mature
banking center serving the rapidly growing econo-
mies ofEast Asia. As with the Euro-dollar market,
the growth of the Asian dollar market has also
generated considerable controversy, both as to the
reasons for its growth and the resultant impacts on
the areas, primarily Singapore and Hong Kong, that
host it.
The purpose ofthis paper is to review briefly the
developments in the Asian dollar market and to
analyze the costs and benefits of this "offshore"
financial facility on the centers in which it is
located. Section I describes the nature ofthe market
and considers the factors that led to its creation and
shaped its development. Section II describes how
the functions and structure of the market have
evolved over time, while Section III analyzes
how the market has affected its primary center,
Singapore.
I. Origin oftheAsian Dollar Market (ADM)
The Asian dollar market consists of a group of
banks in Singapore and Hong Kong that accept
deposits and make loans in U.S. dollars (and certain
other foreign currencies).1 Their deposits are time,
ratherthan checking accounts. Those institutions in
Singapore authorized to accept ADM deposits are
known as "Asian Currency Units" or ACUs. As
with its counterpart-the Euro-dollar market cen-
tered in London, the ADM is "offshore" in the
sense that its financial instruments are denominated
in a currency different from that issued by the host
country. Indeed, by purely financial criterion, the
market centered in Singapore is indistinguishable
from that in London. The only unique characteristic
ofthe two centers is theirgeographic location.
WhyOffshore?
Since the Asian dollar market is an offshore
market, its origins and development need to be
considered in the context of the development of
such markets. Offshore markets for dollars (and
*Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco.
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several other currencies) have developed for three
basic reasons. First, the prominent role ofthe U.S.
dollar in international trade and finance has given
rise toa verysubstantial foreign demandfordollars,
both for transactions and investmentpurposes. For-
eign corporations, as well as U.S. corporations
operating abroad, use dollar instruments frequently
in theiractivities. Foreign governments, too, hold a
substantial portion oftheir international reserves in
dollars. For all ofthese entities, an offshore dollar
market reduces the transactions costs ofconverting
othercurrency into dollars.
Second, the U.S. regulatory environment has
given offshore dollar facilities certain advantages
over those in the domestic U.S. market. Reserve
requirements and ceilings on deposit interest rates
applied to banks here in the U.S. are generally not
applied in the offshore centers. The lack of such
regulation has allowed them to offermore attractive
terms on deposits and loans than domestic U.S.
banks can offer.
Third, offshore centers generally also have
"locational" and "skill" advantages similar tothose accounting for the existence ofregional bank-
ing centers in the U.S. For example, thanks to its
historical role as a world banking center, London
has developed a skilled labor force and body of
expertise in providing banking services. (For a dis-
cussion ofLondon's prominence in the Euro-dollar
market, see the boxed narrative ofthe development
ofthe Euro-dollar market.) Moreover, proximity to
the ultimate users can be a considerable advantage
to an offshore center. For example, since London
banks are in the same (or similar) time zone as their
European customers, they are often able to consum-
mate transactions more quickly than theirNew York
competitors. Close proximity can also make com-
munications and the gathering of infonnation on
conditions affecting the credit-worthiness of bor-
rowers easier. These reasons help explain why off-
shore centers are likely to persist even as the U.S.
eases its regulations on domestic banks.
WhyanAsianOffshoreCenter?
The Asian dollar market illustrates that the crea-
tion of an offshore facility requires a favorable
regulatory climate as well as a demand for its ser-
vices. A need for the facilities ofan Asian offshore
dollar center existed well before its inception in
1968. Developed and developing countries of the
region had long used the dollar extensively in trade
and investment activities. However, prior to 1968
they used the facilities ofthe major Western dollar
centers, primarily New York and London.
One advantage ofan offshore market in the Far
East over that already in Europe involves the time-
zone difference between London and East Asian
capitals. Due to this considerable time-differential,
Far Eastern bankers generally could not consum-
mate transactions with London banks within a sin-
gle day because the London market was closed
duringmostorall ofthe nonnal working day in East
Asia. To bridge this gap, the region needed an
offshore center in the Far East that would be open
when the London market opened. In this respect,
Singapore had the advantage over Hong Kong and
Tokyo--3:30 p.m. there corresponds to 9:00 a.m.
in London.
Still, an Asian offshore market was not feasible
until regulations were alteredtoallow banks there to
compete onequal tenns with their London counter-
parts. The impetus for these changes came in the
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mid-1960s from Bank of America. The U.S. pres-
ence in Viet Nam had increased the use ofdollars in
the region and led Bank of America to expect the
Asian-Pacific area to become a prime source for
dollar funds. The bank set out to attract them.
Its plan was to establish facilities in Asia to offer
smaller investors deposits at competitive market
rates and minimums ofonly $25,000 instead ofthe
$100,000 required in London.
To realize this objective, the Bank of America
had to sell this concepttoagovernmentin Southeast
Asia that would be willing to provide the necessary
tax incentives. With its lack of a natural resource
base, Singapore was highlyreceptiveto the ideaand
was willing to providethe neededfiscal enticements
in hopes that the income generated from the finan-
cial services sector would bolsterthe country's bal-
ance of payments and also help to diversify the
country's economy.
To put the Asian dollar market on equal footing
with the Eurocurrency market, the government of
Singapore in October 1968 exempted from with-
holding tax the interest paid to non-residents plac-
ing deposits with banks in Singapore licensed to
deal in foreign currencies. Before this change, the
withholding tax payable ondeposit interest for non-
resident deposits in foreign currencies was 40 per-
cent. A string of additional tax concessions to
foreign banks to promote the offshore market fol-
lowed. For example, in January 1973, the tax on
bank profits from Asian dollar offshore loans was
cut from 40 percent to 10 percent, while the tax on
the profits of Asian dollar loans to local residents
remained at40percent. (One should note, however,
that ACU's lending to local residents are generally
restricted by the Monetary Authority ofSingapore,
to a total of30 million Singapore dollars (about 1.4
million U.S. dollars perlending institution.) More-
over, several estate and stamp duties were either
waived or rescinded. Chief among these was the
removal in March 1972 of the lO-percent stamp
duty on the face value ofbills ofexchange, certifi-
cates of deposit and promissory notes. Further-
more, in June 1973, stamp duties on offshore loan
agreements were waived. Three years later, non-
resident holdings offoreign currency deposits were
made exempt from estate duties.
Complementing the multitude of tax conces-49sions, the government of Singapore liberalized a
number of regulations affecting foreign banks to
improve their competitive position against their
counterparts in the Eurocurrency market. In Janu-
ary 1972, the monetary authorities in Singapore
abolished the 20 percent liquidityratio that licensed
banks operating in the .Asiandollar.market were
required to hold against deposits. In June 1978,
exchange controls were completely lifted. Resi-
dents were permitted to borrow and lend in all
currencies and to deal in foreign exchange. The
terms and conditions governing offshore banks
were subsequently revised to grant them greater
freedom in dealing with residents. These last mea-
Sllres were aimed at putting Singapore on a more
competitive footing with its major rival in the
region, Hong Kong.
u. Growthand Evolution oftheMarket
Asillyntioned, the Asian dollarmarkethas grown
quickly since its inception in 1968 (see Tables 1-3).
From .a small capitalpase of $30.5 million, the
market in Singapore alone, which now accounts for
the bulk ofactivity, had grown to over $85 billion
by theendof 1981. The estimatesofthe Asiandollar
market activity in Hong Kong given in Table 3
suggest that the overall size ofthe market in the two
centers was about $134.2 billion in 1981, with the
Singapore portion about 75 percentgreaterthan that
in Hong Kong. These figures, however, overstate
the total size as the data include interbank transac-
tions that involve some double-counting of actual
market transactions. Earlier estimates suggest that
the aggregate figures may overstate the actual size
ofthe total market by one-quarter to one-third.
In any case, the market has grown extremely
rapidly. Mostgrowth concentrated in the early years
as demonstrated by the Singapore market which
more than doubled in size in each year through
1973. But although growth subsequently tapered
off, itremains impressive. The increase in the Asian
market's share of total offshore dollar transactions
has been dramatic. Singapore's share of the Euro-
pean and Asian markets combined increased from
.35 percent in 1970 to 4.77 percent by the end of
1981 (Table 4). IfHong Kong's share were also to
be counted, the ADM's overall market share would
have been 7.4 percent.
The sharp increase in Singapore's share of off-
shore dollar activity can be traced in large measure
to the substantial growth in the number of banks
Table 1
Asian DollarMarket in Singapore
Number Total Annual
End of of Assets/Liabilities growth rate
Period ACU's+ U.S. dollars(millions) (percent)
1968 I 30.5
1969 II 123.0 303.3
1970 16 389.8 216.9
1971 21 1,062.8 172.7
1972 24 2,976.1 180.0
1973 46 6,277.1 110.9
1974 56 10,357.5 65.0
1975 66 12,597.4 21.6
1976 69 17,354.1 37.8
1977 78 21,018.3 21.1
1978 85 27,040.1 28.1
1979 101 38,162.7 41.1
1980 108* 54,392.6 42.5
1981 85,852.0 57.8
* end ofMarch 1980
+AsianCurrency Unit(ACU) is a separate accounting unitofbanks andotherfinancial institutionsgivenapproval to transact in the Asian
dollarmarket.
50engaging in the offshore business operating in the
country. From Bank of America's initial entry in
1968, the number of financial institutions taking
Asian dollar accounts in Singapore increased to 120
by the end of 1982. Seventy-four of these institu-
tions are banks, 26 of which are locally incorpo-
rated while 48 are foreign banks. Among the for-
eign banks, U.S. banks are in the lead with 25
facilities, followed by Europe with 22.
The scope of Asian dollar operations in Hong
Kong has shown a somewhat lowerrate ofincrease.
This may reflect the fact that foreign banks were
already well established in Hong Kong when the
Asian dollar market began. For example, the num-
ber of foreign banks increased from 52 to 115 in
Hong Kong from the endof1969 to February 1980,
an increase of 112 percent. Over the same interval,
the numberofforeign banks in Singapore rose from
7 to 48, or nearly sevenfold.
Functions oftheMarket
Two types of transactions are basic to both off-
shore and onshore banking centers. The first is
financial intennediation, in which banks borrow,
that is, take deposits, from non-bank entities with
surplus funds and re-Iend them to those with finan-
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51cial deficits. In perfonning this function, banks
engage in "maturity transfonnation," that is, they
offerliabilities thatare shorter-tennand more liquid
than those of their assets. The second is interb4nk
borrowing and lending. Unlike transactions with
non-banks, the maturities of interbank borrowing
and lending tend to be closely matched because the
interbank lending ofone bank at a given maturity is
the interbank borrowing ofsome other bank at that
maturity. Both typesoftransactions are. prominent
in mature banking markets, but in offshore markets
such as the Eurocurrency markets, wholesale inter-
bank activities tend to dominate.
In its earlieryears, the Asiandollarmarketserved
primarily as a conduit of funds from the Asian
region to Europe and North America. The main
reason behind this transferoffunds lay in the higher
interest rates and greater investment opportunities
existing outside Southeast Asia at the time.z This
pattern is evident in the differing bank/non-bank
shares ofliabilities and assets inthe markets, as well
as in the distribution ofthe maturities ofassets and
liabilities. As Table 5 indicates, deposits of non-
banks (with SingaporeACU's) were slightlygreater
than 62 percent ofall liabilities in 1970, while loans
to non-banks were less than 4percentoftotal assets.
Not surprisingly, given that their main borrowers
were otherbanks, offshorebanks in theAsiandollar
market carefully matched the maturities of their
claims and liabilities prior to 1974 (See Table 6).
As the market matured, however, this pattern
changed dramatically.•. The oil price increases of
1974 caused a large-scale "recycling" of OPEC
funds, fonnerly placed in Europe and North Amer-
ica, back to developing countries. The intervening
years have seen funds flowing from Europe and the
U.S. to Asia via the Asiandollarmarket. In its 1980
Annual Report, the Monetary Authority of Singa-
pore (MAS) said that "76 percent of ACU funds
were taken up in Asia in early 1979." This shift has
led to an equally dramatic change in the composi-
tion andmaturity structureofassets and liabilities in
the market. By 1981, the non-bank share of total
deposits had fallen to 15.9 percent from 62.5 per-
cent in 1970, while loans to non-bank customers
had risen from 3.6 percent ofassets in 1970 to 22.7
percent in 1981. Reflecting this shift toward finan-
cial intennediation, the maturity of the market's
assets has lengthenedsignificantly in comparisonto
that ofits liabilities since 1974.
The Asian dollar market now has a structure
closely resembling thatofthe London Eurocurrency
Table 4
Comparison ofGross Sizeof Offshore Dollar
Market and Assets/liabilities,
Singapore Asian Dollar Market
1970-1981
ACUas
Gross Offshore Dollar ACU Percentof
Year Market Size" Liabilities Offshore Market
(Billion U.S. $) (Billion U.S. $)
1970 110 0.390 0.35
1971 150 1.063 0.70
1972 210 2.976 1.42
1973 315 6.277 1.99
1974 395 10.357 2.62
1975 485 12.597 2.60
1976 595 17.354 2.92
1977 740 21.018 2.84
1978 950 27.040 2.85
1979 1220 38.163 3.13
1980 1655 54.393 3.28
1981 1800 85.852 4.77
*Source: Morgan Guaranty Trust-based on foreign currency liabilities ofbanks in major European countries, the Bahamas, Bahrain,
CaymanIslands, Panama, Canada, Japan, Hong Kong and Singapore.
52market and, in broader terms, a mature offshore
market. Interbank transactions dominate in both
Singapore and London to virtually the same degree.
At the end of 1981, interbank deposits as a propor-
tion of total foreign currency deposits stood at 77
percent in Singapore and 76 percent in London. Not
only is the share in interbankdeposits the same, but
the maturity structure of assets and liabilities are
also virtually identical, as can be seen from Table 7.
The table also shows that the maturity structure of
foreign currency assets and liabilities ofbanksoper-
ating in Singapore and London is highly skewed to
the short-end ofthe market, as is typical ofbanking
markets. For both assets and liabilities, the greatest
number of maturities falls in the category of "less
than one month," followed by "one month to three
months," and then by "three months to twelve
months." Reflecting their financial intermediation
activities, the asset side ofthe banks' balance sheet
is less skewedto the shortendofthe marketthan the
liabilities side. For example, assets with maturities
exceeding one year comprise 24 percent of total
assets in London and 17 percent of total assets in
Singapore. This compares with 4 to 5 percent of
total liabilities in both centers.
One could gain greater insights into the types of
transactions that are conducted in the Asian dollar
market by dividing assets and liabilities into their
bankand non-bank parts. The Singapore authorities
provide no such breakdown at different maturities,
TableS
Asian Dollar Market in Singapore:
Distribution of Sources and Uses of Funds
(Percent)
Item 1970 1975 1976 1977 1981
Total Assets 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Loan to non-bank customers 3.6 26.2 23.3 22.8 22.7
Interbank funds 95.0 72.2 74.6 74.9 72.5
Otherassets 1.4 1.6 2.1 2.3 4.8
Total Liabilities 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Depositsofnon-bankcustomers 62.5 16.4 11.3 10.7 15.9
Interbank funds 36.2 81.7 86.8 87.3 77.4
Otherliabilities 1.3 1.9 1.9 2.0 6.7
Table 6
Composition ofOutstanding Amount ofFunds Raised and
Employed onthe ACU Accounts, by Maturity(percent)
Fund raising Fund employment
Over1 Over3 Over 1 Over 1 Over3 Over 1
month months year month months year
1 but3 but 1 but3 Over 1 but3 but 1 but 3 Over
month months year years 3 month months year years 3
Year-end or less orless orless orless years orless orless orless orless years
1973 23.5 24.7 48.2 3.6 20.6 24.5 50.1 4.8
1974 27.3 26.5 44.1 2.1 19.4 28.1 44.8 7.7
1975 24.8 31.8 41.1 2.3 16.0 29.8 39.3 14.9
1976 49.2 27.9 19.4 1.6 1.9 35.1 27.3 20.9 3.2 13.5
1977 51.0 29.3 17.4 0.9 1.4 35.7 27.6 20.8 4.8 11.1
1978 45.9 30.2 20.8 2.1 1.0 34.4 28.2 20.5 4.9 12.0
1979 48.2 29.0 19.0 3.0 1.0 35.0 26.0 20.0 6.0 13.0
1980 44.4 30.0 20.5 3.0 2.0 32.0 27.0 22.0 5.0 14.0
1981 46.5 30.0 20.0 2.0 1.0 35.0 27.0 21.0 4.0 13.0
Source: Monthly Authority ofSingapore, Quarterly Bulletin
53but theLondonauthorities do. Performing this exer-
cise for Londonbanks, given their strong similari-
ties withtheSingaporemarket, may thereforeprove
useful. Such a breakdown is provided inTable 8.
For the non-banking sector, an extensive matur-
ity transfofillatioIlisevidentwiththeaveragetel1n
to maturity ofloans tononbanks(claims) fariex-'
ceeding that ofdeposits (liabilities). For example,
about58percentoftotal credits are for amaturity of
one year ormore, while 44 percent are for a matur-
ity ofthree yearsormore. Bycontrast, theliabilities
of the non-banking sector are concentrated in the
short-end ofthe market. Maturities ofthree months
or less constitute about 70 percent ofthe liabilities
to non-banks.
In contrast, the assets and liabilities ofinterbank
transactions are almost perfectlymatchedateach
and every maturity. The very limited amount of
maturity· transformation undertaken in trading
among Eurocurrency banks reflects the use of that
market vehicle for arbitrage and hedging activity.
As a hypothetical example ofthe latter activity,
consider an Austrian firm that Uses a local bank to
cover its exchange rate risk in deutschemarks. The
Table 7
Maturity Analysisofliabilities
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and Claims in Foreign Currencies, Banksand
CertainOtherInstitutionsin theUnited Kingdom
Novernber 18,1.981
Total (U.S. $ millions) Banks
Credits Liabilities Credits Liabilities
31.1% 42.9% 26.7% 31.2%
120,218 144,780 1,030 105,344
23.0% 28.9% 20.1% 22.3%
89,009 97,555 77,734 75,313
21.8% 24.5% 17.7% 19.8%
84,574 82,685 68,580 66,817
7.4% 2.3% 3.6% 1.8%
28,618 7,751 14,083 6,144
16.6% 1.6% 4.7% 1.0%
































































































































Endof Assetsi of In Outside Other
Period Liabilities non-banks Total Singapore Singapore Liabilities
1968 30.5 17.8 12.6 NA NA 0.1
1969 123.0 97.9 23.7 NA NA 1.4
1970 389.8 243.7 141.0 5.7 135.3 5.1
1971 1,062.8 237.9 811.2 56.4 754.8 13.7
1972 2,976.1 398.7 2,550.1 145.0 2,405.1 27.3
1973 6,277.2 912.8 5,249.3 405.6 4,843.7 115.1
1974 10,357.5 1,614.2 8,531.4 675.6 7,855.8 211.7
1975 12,597.4 2,067.7 10,294.3 584.0 9,710.3 235.4
1976 17,354.1 1,960.3 15,067.2 799.2 14,268.0 326.6
1977 21,018.3 2,254.6 18,350.3 1,382.8 16,967.5 413.4
1978 27,040.1 3,600.0 21,987.2 1,442.5 20,544.7 1,452.9
1979 38,162.7 5,771.4 29,424.9 1,881.8 27,543.1 2,966.4
1980 54,392.6 9,322.2 40,879.6 1,304.3 39,575.3 4,190.8
1981 85,852.0 13,658.9 66,443.2 1,817.6 64,625.6 5,749.9
*Includes Inter-ACU transactions.
Source: The Monetary Authority ofSingapore.
55local bank switches into OM from schillings and
places proceeds in a Euromark deposit in London.
Theprice that the firm pays to acquire the OMinthe
future is approximately equal to the interestrate
spread between the two currencies. Since the flow
ofinternational tradeisinbothdirections, theuse of
the forward exchange market for hedging activities
should not make the deposit side more liquid than
the asset side.
3 Anothei" major activity in the inter-
bank market and the •forward market is interest
arbitrage. To exploit all excess profitopportunities,
bankswill undertakecoveredinterestarbitrageuntil
interest rate differentials are aligned with forward
premia or discounts.. These types of transactions
best characterize the·London Eurocurrency market
and otheroffshore market centers.
A further reflection ofthe Asian dollar market's
status as an offshore market distinct from the Euro-
markets is that its interbank funds come from any
location where there are smplus funds and not only
from Asian countries. As noted above, one promi-
nent source for funding has been through the
London Eurocurrency market. More recently,
banks in the Middle East have become highly visi-
ble depositors in the Asian dollar market. In fact,
many Arab banks are seeking licenses to operate in
the Asian dollar sector. 4
Non-bank sources ofdeposits come mainly from
multinational cmporations with surplus funds to
invest, central banks and other government agen-
cies responsible for handling foreign exchange re-
serves, affluent individuals andlocal business firms
involved in international and regional trade. Most
nonbank borrowers of funds have until recently
been manufacturers. In 1971, for example, over 50
percent of ACU's loans were to the manufacturing
sector. Sincethen, the share ofloans to the manu-
facturing sector has consistently declined to about
28 percent ofthe total in 1978.
According to the Monetary Authority of Singa-
port.': (MAS), non-bankfinancial institutions andthe
manufacturing sector absorbed more than 56 per-
cent of total non-bank loans in 1979. Amongthe
industries involved were the chemical and chemical
products sectors which include petroleum refining,
metals, textiles and clothing. The share ofloansfor
financing trade and general commerce was also
significant. In addition, some. loans were used to
finance the balance ofpayments needs ofcountries
adversely affected by the higher oil prices during
the year.
Hong Kong versus Singapore
The growth and development ofthe Asian dollar
market has brought a significant differentiation in
the functions carried out by its two major centers,
Singapore and Hong Kong. Indeed, the two centers
tend to complementone another. Hong Kong serves
as the major center for syndicated loans in the Far
East (Table 9), while Singaporedominates the fund-
ing side ofthe market (Table 3). Put simply, Singa-
pore gathers deposits from various outside sources
while Hong Kong deploys them. Reflecting this
division, the liabilitiesofHongKong participantsto
their Singapore countel"parts ($42.6 billion atthe
end of 1981) greatly exceed their claims ($28.4
billion at the end of 1981).
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Source: Bank ofJapan-DevelopmentofIntemational Financial Markets in Hong Kong and Singapore.
56partly the result of their regulatory environments.
In particular, Singapore does not tax the interest
earned by non-residents on their deposits with its
Asian dollar market participants, while Hong
Kong, until recently, applied a 15-percent tax to
such earnings. Singapore's tax policyencouraged
its dominancejn gatheringdeposits. However,
since February 1982, when Hong Kong abolished its
tax on non-resident interest earnings, its ADM de-
posit liabilities have grown bymore than 50percent.
One of Hong Kong's rpain advantages in loan
syndication is itsproximity. to. thelllajor loan cus-
tomers in the Asian market. Its other advantages
include superior legal resources for loan syndica-
tionendeavors andarelatively relaxed bank-regula-
tory climate that includes reporting requirements
much less detailed and extensive than those im-
posed by the MAS on its bankers.
5
Over the past three to four years, the largest
borrowers in Asia have come overwhelmingly from
its.northern portion. In fact, South Korea, Taiwan,
and the Philippines (plus Hong Kong itself) domi-
nate the Asian loan syndicationmarket. These three
countries received nearly $14.7 .billion in syndi-
catedcredits from the offshore dollarmarkets in the
periodfrom 1979-1981,nearlythree-qliartersofthe
totalprovidedtotheAsian-Pacificregion a~awhole
(Table 10). Hong Kong's proximity to thes<;:coun-
tries is aptto make iteasierforitsbankstogatherthe
necessary information and to condlict the negotia-
tions and other transactions such loans entail than
theirSingaporecompetitors.
On the other hand, Singapore is geographically
closer to Indonesia and Malaysia (which together
received a total of$5.0 billion in credits from 1979
to 1981), countries which, given their favorable
growth outlook, show great potential as future mar-
kets for syndicated loans. Hence, Singapore's share

































































70III. Benefits and Costs
To a potentialhost, an offshore financial center
offersBorne obvious benefits, but it carries some
possible drawbacks as well. The benefits include
incre.asedernployment, job4raining•leading toan
upgrading oflabodorce skills, and increased tax
revenue, as well ••as higher export earnings from
financial servicesprovidedtoforeigners. Thedraw-
backs arise from the need ofa successful offshore
centertobeexemptfrommany regulations applied
to. domestic financial institutions.·Thisexemption
may\Veaken regulatory constraints onthe domestic
financial system by making it difficult to prevent
offshore facilities from being used to finance do-
mestic activities. There is, therefore, a danger that
such facilities could interfere with the conduct
of domestic monetary and financial, as well as
exchange-rate, policies.
Any country that has considered establishing an
offshore center has had to weigh the potential dis-
advantages against the likely benefits. The United
States, in establishing an International.8anking
Facility (IBF) in 1980 to allow U.S. bankstocom-
pete with their counterparts in the offshore centers,
imposed rules to ensure that the facilities did not
illterfere with the conductofU.S. monetary policy.
In particular, the U.S. required the IBF to lend only
to non-residents and prohibited IBF checking ac-
counts with non-bank depositors. Japan's authori-
ties have been unwilling to establish an offshore
facility in Tokyo despite widespread support from
Japan's domestic and foreign banking communities
for such facilities because they fear that it would
disrupt their domestic monetary and financial ob-
jectives. The benefits and costs posed by the Asian
dollar market to its host countries are therefore
important to an understanding of that market's
development.
Singapore's Experience
Singapore's experience with offshore facilities is
likely to be more relevant for other countries than
that ofHong Kong. The reason is that Hong Kong
has no central bank and only a very limited degree
ofindependence in its monetary policy. HongKong
58
alsohasnogovernmentdebtto manage orexchange
control to administer. The. Colony's financial poli-
cies aim at supervising and regulating banks, and
fo)"thisreason,. offshore·facilities do.not·pose as
greata"threat"to its dolllestic monetary and ex-
change rate policies as theymayposeelsewhere. In
c?ntrast,the.MASperformsall the traditional func-
tionsofacentral bank except issuing currency. Its
functions~ndresponsibilities include the supervi-
si?nandregulation ofbanking and financial institu-
tions,exchange control, and the supervision ofthe
businessof()ffshore banks.
The regulations Singapore applies to offshore
banksaredesigned, inpart, tobeconsistentwiththe
government's other financial policy objectives,
which include the protection of the local banking
industry, control over the exchange rate, and mon-
etary control. Before embarking on their Asian
dollar business, for example, banks in Singapore
must seeka license from the MAS. Furthermore, in
carrying outtheir offshore activities, the licensed
i:>anRs must set uP. their own separate accounting
d~partI1lents-the Asian Currency Units. Each
ACU receives individual management guidelines
that govern even the sources and uses ofits funds.
The MAS provides four types of banking
licenses: (I) a complete banking license, (2) a
restricted license, (3) a license for offshore opera-
tions, and (4) a license to carry out merchant bank-
ing operations. TheJourlicenses correspondtofull,
restricted, offshore and merchant banks, respec-
tively. As the name implies, full commercial banks
provide a complete range of commerical banking
services. Restricted banks, unlike full banks,
cannot accept deposits of less than 250,000 Sin-
gapore dollars (about $20,000 U.S. dollars) and
offer savings accounts. Thus, restricted banks pro-
vide wholesale rather than retail banking services.
Offshore banks are not allowedto acceptdeposits in
Singapore dollars but can make loans in Singapore
dollars and foreign currency to domestic residents
and non-residents. Their activities are mainly con-
fined to wholesale banking. Finally, the merchant
banks offer the traditional range of services inunderwriting stocks and bonds, investment coun-
selling, and (increasingly) the packaging ofloans to
the FarEast.
The licensing procedure is intended to preventan
influx of foreign banks operating in the domestic
money market from jeopardizingthe··localbanking
industry. A seriesoHiscalincentives provide fur-
therprotection.Loans by offshore banks to domes-
tic residents are subject to a corporate tax rate of40
percent, while loanstonon~residentsare subjecttoa
concessionaryrateofonly10percent. Moreover, an
offshore bank's total·lending.to non-residents is
generally limited to 30 million Singapore dollars.
Theconcessionary rate of 10 percent along with the
absence of reserve requirements on ACU deposits
were aimed at putting Singapore on a competitive
footing with otheroffshore centers.
On the ACU part of their business, domestic
banks are subject to the same treatment as foreign
banks, but reserve requirements are imposed on
theirSingapore dollardeposits. These requirements
consist of: (1) a six percent non-interest-bearing
cashreserve to be heldwith the Monetary Authority
ofSingapore; (2) a ten percent primary liquid asset
requirement-notes and coin, excess cash reserves
held with the MAS, call loans, and short-term
treasury securities; and (3) a ten percent second tier
of liquid assets including excess items under (2),
c6mmercial·bills, and longer-term government
securities.
Because Singapore allows domestic residents to
hold foreign currency deposits, it has had to main-
tainthe 40 percent withholding tax on domestic
non-bank residents' interest from foreign currency
deposits in ACU's, even though foreign-owned
deposits are exempt from tax. The uniform rate of
taxation on domestic-owned deposits is necessary
to pre-empt extra incentives for domestic residents
to switch from domestic currency deposits to for-
eign currency deposits. Non-bank foreigners are
discouraged from holdinginterest-bearing deposits
in local currency (Singapore dollars) because they
would be liable for the 40percent withholding levy.
The tax structure, therefore, gives foreigners strong
incentives to deal with ACU's only in foreign
monies, but gives domestic residents no compar-
able incentives to move outofSingapore dollars.
Nevertheless, the tax structure does not remove
all incentives for residents to switch to foreign cur-
59
rency deposits. While no tax advantage accrues to
domestic residents holding foreign currency de-
posits,there are incentives for the banks to encour-
age domestic residents to.switch from a Singapore
dollardepositto an ADM deposit. Chiefamong the
inccntivesis the·reserve·reqnirementdemanded for
Singapore dollardeposits butnot forU.S. dollar(or
other foreign currency) deposits. The requirement
amounts to a tax on banks' local currency liabilities
because thereserves are non-interesteaihing assets.
To avoid the reserve requirements on Singapore
dollar deposits, .the banks can Offer residents an
ADM deposit rather than a Singapore dollar de-
posit.
6 In fact, the reduction in the effective cost of
deposits is such that the banks can offer a slightly
more attractive yield on the ADM deposits and
thereby encourage domestic residents to make the
switch.
Clearly, such shifts could have a debilitating
effect on domestic monetary control. The exchange
of domestic currency deposits for ADM accounts
wouldreduce the domestic banks' Singapore dollar
deposit liabilities and lower the broadly-defined
domestic money stock (since ADM accounts are
time deposits, they would most likely substitute for
similar domestic deposits). To avoid this problem,
the Monetary Authority ofSingapore faced several
possible options in the early 1970s
7
: (1) rely on
moral suasion to discourage domestic banks from
conducting such operations, (2) pay a competitive
interest rate onrequiredreserves, thereby removing
the incentive, (3) impose direct penalties on such
shifts, (4) subject Asian dollar market deposits
to reserve requirements, or (5) eliminate domestic
reserve requirements. Of these options, Singapore
authorities have come to rely on moral suasion.
Imposing reserve requirements on ADM deposits
would have removed banks' incentives to offer
more. attractive rates on their ADM currency de-
posits, but the ultimate effect would have been to
reduce. their ability to offer interest rates competi-
tive with those offered in other offshore markets.
That option would simply have shifted ADM trans-
actions to some other center. Eliminating domestic
reserve requirements would have made domestic
monetarycontrol much moredifficult, whilepaying
interest on reserves could involve considerable
cost. The option ofimposing penalties was deemed
infeasible.Still, while moral suasion may have been the
m()st feasible alternative, it is unlikely to be very
effective when incentives for shifts from the off-
sh().re to the .onshore market are strong. A classic
illustration of this difficulty in separating off-
shore<fromdomestic transactions occurred in 1972-
1973whenthere were heavy inflows ofspeculative
capital:
"Becausedomestic interest rates were higher
tha.nthose in the Eurocurrency market, they
swappedforeign currency for local currency
throughthe medium of local banks-a prac-
ticeallowedunderthe termsandconditionsof
ACU operations-and re-lent such funds to
local residents at a higher rate for speculative
investment. Between January 1972 and
March 1973, ACU interbank deposits with
Singapore banks increased by an incredible
259 percent. The upshot was excess liquid-
ity at home which threatened Singapore's
exports.',g
Hong Kong too experienced a similardestabiliz-
ingeffectduring the 1972-74 period. These experi-
encesdemonstrate that the measures necessary to
make an offshore center competitive may at times
interfere with otherpolicy objectives. Nonetheless,
the benefits ofan offshore centermay well be great
enough tojustifyincurring the costs.
Benefits
The most immediately discernible benefit of the
Asian dollar market for Singapore lies in the valu-
able financial services it has provided, services that
have improved the country's balance ofpayments.
The Singapore economy has shown a consistent
ba1a~ceoftrade deficitandthe gapbetweenimports
and exportshas widened in recent years because of
the run-up in oil prices. This shortfall in trade has
been met through large surpluses on services and
net inflows on capital account. Although Singa-
pore's balance ofpayments datais too incompleteto
estimate the contribution of financial services to
offsetting the trade deficit, the overall contribution
ofthe service sector has been SUbstantiaL In 1981,
the balance oftrade deficit amounted to $6.3 bil-
lion, of which 60 percent was offset by the net
surplus on the service account.
In addition to helping finance the trade deficit,
theAsi~n dollar market has contributed heavily to
the. growth .of Singapore's economy. The growth
rates ofthefinancial servicesectorhavebeenrobust
compared to othercomponents ofGNP. Priorto the
inGeption of the Asian dollar market in 1968, the
share ofGNP that consisted of financial and busi-
nessservicesamountedto 8percent, butin 1980this
ratio stood at more than 18 percent. The growth of
the financial servkesectorwas substantially higher
than the growthofGNP, which averaged an annual
rate of8 percent overthe same period.
Finally, the existence ofan offshore centertrans-
mits to the populace of the host country valuable
skills in the fields ofbanking and finance. Between
1970 and.1979, employmentin the financial service
sector in Singapore has grown much more rapidly
than employmentin eitherthe manufacturing sector
or thetotal economy. By the same token, the pro-
portionofskilledworkers employed in the financial
sector is nearly twice that for the economy as a
whole (skilled workers are defined here to include
professional, technkal, administrative and mana-
gerialworkers). Thus, the establishment ofan offc
sh()re .market has not only soaked up an excess
supply of labor but has added to the human capital
ofSingapore.
Furthermore, the presence of foreign banks and
their a<;Gompanying staff has probably stimulated
the development ofa string ofcomplementary ser-
vice activities. Chief among these would be ser-
vkesassociated with tourism. These services add
furthertothe numberofemployedandthe skilllevel
ofthe population. Finally, the presence ofan inter-
national financial market has probably made Singa-
pore more attractive to regional corporations and
multinational firms as a location for theiroperations
in the FarEast.
IV. Conclusion
Theneedfor an Asiandollarmarketwas apparent
long before its inception in 1968. Countries in the
region were turning to the major western dollar
centers, primarily New York and London, until
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Singapore used a series of tax concessions and
changes in banking regulation to encourage the
development of an Asian offshore center. Begin-
ning in 1968, direct stimuli such as exemptionsfrom interest withholding tax, lower taxes on bank
profits from Asian dollar offshore loans, and the
liftingofall exchangecontrols sp~rredthe marketto
its phenomenal growth.. The market began as a
conduit for funds from Asia to the European mar-
kets,J:mchasquickly becOIlle amllture offshore
banking center.
The creation ofthe Asian dollar market has cost
Singapore some loss ofdomestic monetary control
but the benefits to the country seem to support its
initial decision. The boom in financial services has
iInptovedthecountry'sbalarice bfpayments arid
imparted additional jobs and skills in banking and
financeJo its population.
The Asian dollar market.is likely to undergo
many more changes in the years ahead. Atpresent,
Singapore is still mainly a fund collection center,
although its government is hoping to make inroads
into Hong Kong's share of the loan syndication
business. This ambition was succinctly expressed
by Singapore's Trade and Finance Minister, Coh
ChokTo~g, in his budget speech of 1980: "Inthe
1980s,we shalldevelop Singapore into a financial
supermarket offering a wide and sophisticated
rangeoffinancial services."
What. is .certain. about..the future.of the Asian
dollar market is that otherAsian countries willpose
stiffer competition in the years ahead. Hong Kong,
for example, is trying.to increaseitsfundcollection
aCtivities, while Japan is contemplating theestab-
lishment ofan international banking facility on its
shores. The market will also be affected by recent
financial developments within the international
banking community. In particular, how that com-
munity resolves the problems oflendingto develop-
ing countries will be key to the further development
ofthe Asian dollar market.
FOOTNOTES
1.ln ;ictuality, these markets involve trading in a wide
sp~ctrum of currencies, but becausEl of the. dominance of
the dollar-90 percent of transactions in the Asi;indollar
markets and 75 percent in the Euro-currencymarkets-the
terms Asian dollarandEuro-dollarare generally used inter-
changeably with Asian currency and Euro-currency.
2. See the Annual Report of the Monetary Authority of
Singapore for 1973.
3. See McKinnon, 1979.
4. See the Far Eastern Economic Review, July 24, 1981.
5. Certain aspects of Singapore's tax structure are less
favorable compared to Hong Kong, though. For example,
foreign residents of Singapore pay a 40 percent maximum
taxon theirincome, while HongKong leviesagraduatedtax
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with a maximum of 25 percent. The overall corpor;ite tax
rate in Singapore is also higher-40 percent compared to
16.5 percent in Hong Kong-but ACU's interest in their
earnings from loans to non-residents enjoys the more ad-
vantageous tax rate of 10 percent.
6. Admittedly, banks thereby expose themselves to foreign
exchange risk since. they have a future liability in U.S.
dollars and spot assets in Singapore dollars. However
this risk can be hedged bya "swap" of Singapore for
U.S. dollars, that is, by selling Singapore dollars in the
spot exchange market and purchasing them in the forward
market.
7. See Hewson, 1979.
8. See the AnnualReportofthe MAS for 1979.REFERENCES
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